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[So F. No. 19325. In Bank. Jan. 16, 1958.]

JOHN F. THORMAN, Respondent, v. INTERNATIONAL
ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES
AND MOVING PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS
OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA et aI.,
Appellants.
[1] Labor-lJnions-Membership.-A. labor organization may not
properly maintain. a closed union and a closed shop at the same
"time.
[S] Id.-Bemedies-Jurisdiction.-A. state court has jurisdiction
to grant both legal and equitable relief in disputes involving
labor practices in violation of valid state laws where interstate commerce is not involved," J,ut may not grant equitable
relief by way of injunction in controversies involving commerce between the states.
[S] Id.-Remedies-Pleading.-In a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a local union to admit plaintiff moving picture oper-

)

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Labor, § 142 et seq.; Am.Jur., Labor, §§ 320,
556 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Labor, § 20; (2) Labor, §§ 24, 25;
[3) Labor, 127; [4] Appeal and Error, §125; [5,6,9] Labor,
124; [7] Labor, §29.5; [8] Damages, §49.
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ator to membership, an amended complaint wherein it ap-;
peared only that defendant asserted jurisdiction over moving'
picture operators and projectionists employed in a city and
county, that it exercised a monopoly over all employment of
such operators and projectionists employed in the city and
county, and that it maintained and enforced clJsed shop agreements with all employers who owned or operated motion
picture theaters covering the employment of such operators
and projectionists in the city and county, raised no issue as
to whether plaintiff's employment was or was not one which
affected interstate commerce.
Appeal-Objections-Adherence to Theory as to Issues Presented.-In a proceeding in mandamus to compel a local union
to admit plaintiff moving picture operator to membership, the
union, having failed to raise an issue as to plaintiff's employment having a substantial effect on interstate commerce or to
submit evidence in the trial court in proof thereof, is foreclosed on appeal from asserting it.
Labor-Remedies-Jurisdiction.-In a proceeding in mandamus to compel a local union to admit plaintiff moving picture operator to membership, where the employment involved
concerned only a theater in a certain city and county, the
dispute was not one within the cognizance of the National
Labor Relations Board and the state courts were Dot deprived
of their jurisdiction to resolve the controversy and award
equitable relief and damages for tortious conduct.
ld. - Remedies - Jurisdiction. - Where an experienced and
qualified moving picture operator has met all lawful and
reasonable requirements for membership in a local union of
moving picture and projecting machine operators, mandamus
is a proper remedy to compel his admission to membership in
the union.
'
ld.-Remedies-Damages.-In a proceeding in mandamus to
compel a local union to admit plaintiff moving picture operator
to membership, it was proper to award damages based on the
difference between plaintiff's actual earnings from theater
employment and the actual earnings of the projectionist who
replaced him in a certain theater during the period involved,
disregarding plaintiff's earnings from work other than theater
work.
Damages-Attorney Fees.-Attorney fees are not recoverable
as damages in the absence of contractual, statutory or other
proper basis therefore.
Labor-Remedies-Conditions Precedent.-A moving picture
operator seeking a writ of mandate to compel his admission
to membership'in a local union was not required to exhaust
administrative remedies within the union before seeking ju-
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dicial relief where the trial court found on substantial evidence that, had he attempted to appeal from his rejection of
membership, it would have been a futile, useless and idle act.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco. Thomas M.Foley, Judge.
Modified and affirmed.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel a local union to admit
plaintiff to membership. Judgment granting writ, modified
and affirmed.
Tobriner, Lazarus, Brundage & Neyhart, Mathew O. Tobriner and Irving S. Rosenblatt, Jr., for Appellants.
Pembroke Gochnauer for Respondent.
SHENK, J.-This is an appeal by the defendants from a
judgment granting to the plaintiff a writ of mandate to
compel his admission to membership in the defendant Loc~
162 of the Moving Picture and Projecting Machine Operators
of the City and County of San Francisco. Damages in the
sum of $1,289.70 and $1,500 attorney fees were also awarded
to the plaintiff.
Local 162 is a member of the International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine
Operators of the United States and Canada. Through contracts with 66 of the 70 motion picture theaters in San Francisco it controlled working conditions for projectionists and
machine operators. It limited the number of journeymen
members to 112 all of whom were regularly employed, and in
addition dispatched machine operators and projectionists for
another 175 jobs from the membership of other locals. The
plaintiff is an experienced and qualified machine operator,
having been engaged in that work since 1942 except for Army
service. He is a member of Local B18, a subsidiary of Local
162. Over and above his dues to 'Local B18, he is required to
pay a "working fee" to Local 162 in the same amount as its
journeymen members. However, he is not a member of that
union, he lacks the security of employment and seniority
possessed by the members thereof, and has no voice as to its
organization, its. contracts or working conditions imposed by
it.
Prior to the commencement of this action the plaintiff was
regularly dispatched to work by the officials of Local 162.
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In Janua111953 he filed with that local his written appliea- .
tion for journeyman membership accompanied by one-half of
the initiation fee, as required by its constitution. He was
notified in writing to take the entrance examination conducted
by the local. He passed it, filed a doctor's certificate showing
a good physical condition, and appeared at a regular meeting
relating to applications for memberships. His application
failed to receive a favorable two-thirds vote of the members
voting, as required by the local's constitution, and was rejected. The trial court found that the "plaintift meets all
lawful and reasonable requirements for membership in Local
162; and that plaintiff has performed each and every act heretofore required of him under the constitution and by-laws
of Loca1162 as a condition precedent to admission to journey!
men membership therein, save and except said membership
vote. tt After the rejection of his application Local 162 dispatched a newly-admitted journeyman to perform the work
for which the plaintiff had been regularly employed and ~e
plaintiff has since then been employed intermittently e1se~ ..
where.'
[1] The plaintiff contends, and rightly so, that a labor .
organization may not properly maintain a closed union and.
eIosed shop at the same time. (James v. Marinship Corp., 25
Ca1.2d 721 [155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 900]; Dotson v. InterMtional AZliance etc. Employes, 34 Ca1.2d 362 [210 P.2d 5].)
[2] Furthermore, a reference to the opinion in the case of
Garmon v. San Diego Building Trades Councs'Z, ante, p. 595
[320 P.2d 473], this day decided, discloses that under pres:
ent law a state court has jurisdiction to grant both legal and
equitable relief in disputes involving labor practices in viola!
tion of valid state laws where interstate commerce is not in~ .
volved but may not grant equitable relief by way of injunction
in controversies involving commerce between the states. The
plaintiff contends that interstate commerce is not here involved and that the state court therefore has jurisdiction to
grant both the equitable and legal relief sought by him.
.
[3] Whether the cause of action alleged by the plaintiff is
one entirely local in character or one also affecting interstate
commerce must be determined by an examination of the record
in this case. It appears from the amended complaint that
the defendant Local 162 asserts ce jurisdiction over moving
picture operators and projectionists employed in the CitY
and County of San Francisco, State of California"; that
Local 162 exercises ce a monoply over all employment in the
occupation of moving picture machine operators and pr~
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jectionists employed in the said City and County," and "does
possess, maintain and enforce closed shop agreements with all
the employers who own or operate motion picture theaters
covering the employment of moving machine operators and
projectionists in said City and County"; that the plaintiff
"entered the jurisdiction of Local 162 in February, 1942,
when he commenced work as a moving picture machine
operator and projectionist in San Francisco"; that "from
June, 1951 until June 7, 1953 plaintiff was regularly employed as a moving picture machine operator and projectionist in the Center Theater in said City and County";
that on or about May 22, 1953 defendants notified the plaintiff
in writing that one Joseph Ford, a member of Local 162, bad
requested plaintiff's job at the Center Theater and that said
Ford would take over plaintift"s job at said theater on June
7, 1953," and that "defendants tbereafter dispatched said
Ford to said Center Theater on June 7, 1953 in the place and
stead of plaintift' and the plain tift' was thereby deprived of his
employment and the right to work in his trade in said City
and County."
There is nothing in the foregoing to suggest that the employment from which the plain tift' was deprived was one
which aft'ected interstate commerce. Likewise, there is nothing in the answer which in any way raised such an issue
either by denial or in the allegations of affirmative defenses.
As the issue was not raised by the pleadings or the proof the
trial court made no findings of fact as to whether the plaintift"s employment was or was not one which affected interstate commerce.
[4] The defendants seek now, for the first time on appeal,
to show that the plaintiff's employment had a substantial'
eft'ect on interstate commerce and that thereby the state court
was deprived of jurisdiction under the rule announced by
the Supreme Court of the United States in Guss v. Utah
Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 [77 S.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d
601], Amalgamated Mea·t Cutters ·v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc.,
853 U.S. 20 177 S.Ct. 604, 1 L.Ed.2d 613], and San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 853 U.S. 26 [77 S.Ct.
607, 1 L.Ed.2d 618]. This request would require a factual
determination which on the present record cannot be made.
Having failed to raise the issue in the pleadings and to submit evidence in the trial court in proof thereof, the defendants
are now foreclosed from asserting it. (Seven Up etc. Co. 'V.
Grocery etc. Union, 40 Cal.2d 368, 372 [254 P.2d 544, 33
A.L.R.2d 327].)
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[6] The fact that the defendant Loca1162 is affiliated with
the Internatiollal Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and
Moving Picturr ~t f\Chine Operators of the United States and
Canada, also a ddendant herein, and presumably might make
the effect of the limitations imposed on the plaintiff's employment felt on a nationwide scale is of no consequence.
The employment involved in the present case concerned only
the Center Theater in the City and County of San Francisco
and there is no hint that the business of that employer affected interstate commerce. (See 29 U.S.C.A. § 151, Findings
and declaration of policy, and § 152, Definitions.) Accordingly the dispute is not one within the cognizance of the
National Labor Relations Board and the state courts are not
deprived of their jurisdiction to resolve the controversy and
to award equitable relief and damages for tortious conduct.
[6] It is clear that the plaintiff's cause of action falls
within the principles announced in James v. Marinskip Corp.,
supra, 25 Cal.2d 721, and that mandamus is a proper remedy.
(Cason v. Glass Bottle Blowers Assn., 37 Cal.2d 134 [231 P.2d
6, 21 A.L.R.2d 1387]; Dotson v. International Alliance etc.
Employes, supra, 34 Cal.2d 362.) [7] The defendants claim,
however, that in determining t.he plaintiff's loss of earnings
the trial court failed to take into consideration earnings by
the plaintiff in other than theater employment, and that such
loss of earnings was based in part on overtime work available
at the Center Theater whereas the plaintiff's health would not
have permitted him to perform such work. It appeared that
the plaintiff had earnings from other than theater work both
before and after his discharge from the Center Theater. The
court awarded damages based upon the difference in the
plaintiff's actual earnings from theater employment and the
actual earnings of the projectionist who replaced him at the
Center Theater during the period involved. This was a
reasonable and proper basis to award damages. (Dotson v.
Intef"1lation<u Alliance etc. Employes, supra, 34 Ca1.2d 362,
374; Zinn v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 24 Cal.2d 290, 297, 298 [149
P.2d 177] ; Harris v. National Union etc. Cooks &- Stewards.
98 Cal.App.2d 733, 738 [221 P.2d 136].) The findings of
fact and conclusions of law are essentially in accordance with
the allegations of the amended complaint as to the right to the
writ of mandate and the award of damages and there is substantial evidence in support thereof.
[8] It is claimed that the award for attorney feE'S is not
recoverable in this case. As tlJere was no contractual, statutory or other proper basis for the award it was therefore im-
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properly made. (Viner v. Untrecht, 26Ca1.2d 261, 272 [158
P.2d 3}.}
[9] The defendants also claim that the plaintiff failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies within the defendant
unions. The trial court found on substantial evidence that had
the plaintiff attempted to appeal from his rejection of memo
bership it would have been a "futile, useless and idle act.
. . ." Accordingly he was not required to pursue such a
remedy. (Civ. Code, § 3532; Elevator Operators etc. Union
v. Newman, 80 Ca1.2d 799,809 [186 P.2d I}.)
The jUdgment is modified by striking therefrom the award
for attorney fees in the amount of $1,500 and,as so modified,
is affirmed, with costs to neither party.
Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J.t concurred.

)

TRAYNOR, J .-1 dissent.
The crucial question in this ease is whether the union is
committing an unfair labor practice that aftects interstate
commerce within the meaning of the Labor Management
Relations Act. If it is, exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the
National Labor Relations Board. (Garner v. Teamsters etc.
Union,346 U.S. 485, 501 [74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228}.) Juris·
diction of the subject matter may not be conferred upon the
court by the parties (SampseU v. Superior Court, 32 CaL2d
763, 778, 776 [197 P.2d 739}), and lack of such jurisdiction
may be raised for the first time on appeal. (Costa v. Banta,
98 Cal.App.2d 181, 182 [219 P.2d 478}.) In the present case
the jurisdictional question was not only raised on appeal
but before, during, and after the trial; and proof was taken
on that issue. Seven Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Drivers
Union, 40 Cal.2d 368, 372 [254 P.2d 544, 33 A.L.R.2d 327},
is not in point, for there the question of interstate commerce
was not raised. (See Seven Up Bottling Co. v. Grocery Drivers
Union, ante, p. 625 [320 P.2d 892].) In the present case
the defendants raised the"issue in a demurrer, which was
overruled, wherein it was pleaded that the complaint was un·
certain in that" it cannot be ascertained therefrom: . . . (d)
Whether or not the closed.shop agreements referred to in
paragraph V, page 3, line 10, involve theaters engaged in
interstate or intrastate business,
"(e) Whether or not the job at Center Theater, referred
to in paragr~ph XIII, page 10, constitutes employment at a
theater engaged in interstate or intrastate commerce."
Furthermore, the trial court permitted defendants to in·
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troduce evidence over objections by plaintiff that theaterit'
,

with which Local 162 has closed-shop contracts were members
of interstate chains. -The evidence indicated that different
theaters were members of chains such as Fox West Coast,
Inter-Mountain Fox, Stanley Werner Theatres (a chain of
about 200), National Theatres (a chain of about (25), Loew's,
Incorporated (a chain of about 300), Paramount-Dumont (a
chain of about 250), and RKO (a chain of about 200). It
was estimated that 30 per cent of the theaters in San Francisco
were connected with interstate chains. This evidence was
undisputed.
The defendants also submitted proposed amendments to the
1indings of fact and conclusions of law that "said motion
pictures theaters are engaged in and affect interstate com·
merce; that said employers are engaged in commerce within
the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act . . ."
and that "sole and exclusive jurisdiction for any claimed unlawful activities of Local 162 falls under the Labor Management Relations Act. . . ."
The fact that there is no evidence or finding that the Center
Theater was engaged in interstate commerce does not make
the action local in nature, for plaintiff could have been displaced from any theater by a member of Local 162 under the
contracts, and the refusal of Local 162 to dispatch plaintiff
to suitable employment is a refusal as to all the theaters.
The discrimination caused by Local 162 applies to all theaters,
for no theater will hire plaintiff unless he is dispatched by
Local 162. Moreover, plaintiff's prayer substantiates the in·
volvement of all theaters, for he prays for a mandatory injunction "compelling defendants forthwith to dispatch plain.
tiff to suitable employment as a moving picture machine
operator or projectionist within the jurisdiction of Local
162, " which involves all the theaters in San Francisco, and
in the alternative for an injunction to prevent defendants
from interfering with plaintiff's right to employment "at the
Center Theater in the City and County of San Francisco or
at any other motion picture theater in said City and County."
The involvement of all theaters is further emphasized by
plaintiff in his Supplemental Memorandum wherein he states:
IC Here the entire controversy is between Thorman and the
union" and that "he [plaintiff] is not suing to get back a job
at Center Theater. . . . " Thus the union's unfair labor
practice, if any. encompasses all the theaters in San Francisco,
and plaintiff So alleges.
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In Oms v. Utah LabQr Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1, 3, 10
[77 S.Ct. 598, 1 L.Ed.2d 801], it is stated that by the use of
the language "affecting commerce" in the Labor Management Relations Act, Congress meant to "reach the full extent
of its power under the Commerce Clause" even though a "noman's land" is created when the National Labor Relations
Board refuses to exercise jurisdiction and state courts are precluded from acting. If the effect on commerce is more than
de minimis, it is covered by the Labor Management Relations
Act. (National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Building
&- Oonstruction Trades Oouncil, 341 U.S. 675, 684-685 [71
S.Ct. 943, 95 L.Ed.2d 1284].) When an unfair labor practice
affects a single theater that is one of a multistate chain, the
effect on commerce is sufficient to faU within the Labor Management Relations Act. (In the Matter of American Federation of Musicians, Local No. 24, 92 N.L.R.B. 1528, aff'd sub
nom. Gamble Enterprises, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Board, 203 F.2d 565; In the Matter of Balaban &- Katz, 87
N.L.R.B. 1071, 1072.) The sole method by which a state may
acquire jurisdiction, when interstate commerce is affected, is
by a cession of jurisdiction under section 10(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act (Guss case, supra, 353 U.S. at 9)
and there is no such cession here.
Plaintiff's allegations charge an unfair labor practice within the meaning of the Labor Management Relations Act, section8(b)(2), 29 U.S.C.A. section 158 (b)(2), which reads as
follows:
" (b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents- . . .
"(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) of
this section or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to
tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership."
Subsection (a) (3) refers to discrimination by an employer
"in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or
condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization . . . . " It is obvious that it
is because of such discrimination resulting from the contracts
between Local 162 and the theaters that plaintiff seeks relief
in the courts to compel the union to admit him to membership.
Numerous similar cases demonstrate that the National Labor
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Relations Board can not only terminate the unfair labor practice but order the union to make the plaintiff whole for loss of
wages. (Radio Officers' Union v. National Labor Relations
Board, 347 U.S. 17, 54-55 [74 S.Ot. 323, 98 L.Ed. 455] ; Born
v. Laube, 213 F.2d 407, 409, rehearing denied 214 F.2d 349,
certiorari denied 348 U.S. ~55 [75 S.Ot. 80, 99 L.Ed. 6741;
National Labor Relations Board v. Philadelphia Iron 1V orks,
211 F.2d 937, 943; National Labor Relations Board v. George
D. A1whter Co., 209 F.2d 273, 276-277; National Labor Rela.
tions Board v. BeU Aircraft Corp., 206 F.2d 235, 236; Na·
tiond Labor Relations Board v. International Union, 194 F.2d
698, 700; National Labor Relations Board v. Kingston Cake
Co., 191 F.2d 563, 566; Union Starch &; Refining Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 186 F.2d 1008, 1014.) Other
state courts in similar cases have refused both injuncth'e and
compensatory relief on the ground that exclusive jurisdiction
therefor is vested in the National Labor Relatious Board.
(Collins v. Merritt-Chapman If SC()tt, 91 Ga.App. 856 [87
S.E.2d 337, 340]; Sterling v. Local 438, 207 Md. 132 [113
A.2d 389, 396] ; Real v. Curran, 285 App.Div. 552 [138 N.Y.S.
2d 809, 812J; Ryan v. Simons, 277 App.Div. 1000 [100
N.Y.S.2d 18, 19J; Mahoney v. Sailors' Union of the Pacific,
45 Wn.2d 453 [275 P.2d 440, 444-445].) Although International Sound Technicians v. Superior Oourt, 141 Oal.App.
2d 23, 30 [296 P.2d 395], held that the plaintiff need not seck
relief from the National Labor Relations Board and upheJd
the state court's jurisdiction to award damages for loss of
wages, that case is no longer law. State courts may not afford
a parallel remedy to one the National Labor Relations Board
is empowered to give; the board's jurisdiction is exclusive.
(Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Pairlawn Meats, Inc., 353
U.S. 20, 23; Born v. Laube, I'U-pra, 213 F.2d at 409 j spe dis·
senting opiniou in Garmon v. San Diego BUtlding Trades
Oouncil, ante, p. 595 [320 P.2d 473].)
Plaintiff contends nevertheless that the National Labor
Relatiolls Board cannot compel the union to admit him to
membership and that the state court has jurisdiction to grant
that relief. (Real v. Curran, supra, 138 N.Y.S.2d at 813.)
It is clear, however, that the board could order the union to
terminate the unfair labor practice. If the union did so by
admitting plaintiff to membership, he would receive the very
relief reqnested. If the union did so by terminating the dis·
crimination, it would thereby trrminate the closed·shop, and
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief in the courts of this
state under James .v. Marinship Corp., 25 Ca1.2d 721, 730
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[155 P.2d 329, 160 A.L.R. 9tJO). In either event plaintiff
would obtain from the National Labor Relations Board all the
relief to which he is entitled.
I would reverse the judgment and remand the case with
directions to the trial court to dismiss the action for lack of
jurisdiction.
Gibson, C. J., and Carter, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied February
13, 1958. Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Traynor, J., were
of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
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